This chapter presents a short history of psychological theory and research on emotion since the beginnings of psychology as an academic discipline in the last third of the 19 th century. Using William James's theory of emotion as the starting point and anchor, the history of research on five main questions of emotion psychology is charted. These concern, respectively: (1) the causal generation of emotions; (2) the effects of emotion on subsequent cognition and behavior; (3) the nature of emotion; (4) the evolutionary and learning origins of the emotion system; and (5) the neural structures and processes involved in emotions.
to the perception of a bear) activate one of several evolutionary bodily reaction programs located in the motor cortex (e.g., the "fear" reaction program). As a consequence, efferent impulses are sent to the inner organs and muscles of the body, where they produce a complex, emotion-specific pattern of bodily changes (e.g., the fear pattern). These bodily changes are in turn registered by interoceptors in the viscera, skin, and muscles, whose signals are transmitted back to the sensory cortex, where they produce another neural activation pattern which is the neurophysiological correlate of an emotional feeling (e.g., fear). Hence, neurophysiologically speaking, emotions are simply special patterns of excitation in the sensory cortex, caused by feedback from the bodily changes reflexively elicited by emotional stimuli.
Let us now look at what has been learned since James's times about the five questions of emotion psychology.
The Process of Emotion Generation
Worcester's Critique Shortly after it had been proposed, James's theory of emotion came under heavy attack (see Gardiner, 1896) . One of the objections raised concerned James's suggestion that emotions are elicited by sense-perceptions in a reflex-like manner. Critics such as Worcester (1893) and Irons (1894) argued that this proposal conflicts with several well-known facts.
Specifically, referring to James's example of a wanderer who feels fear upon encountering a bear, Worcester pointed out that a well-armed hunter might feel joy rather than fear when sighting a bear, and that even an ordinary person might only feel curiosity if the bear were chained or caged. Worcester concluded from these cases that fear is not directly caused by sense-perceptions, but by certain thoughts to which these perceptions may give rise.
Specifically, the wanderer feels afraid of the bear only if he believes that the bear may cause him bodily harm (Worcester, 1893, p. 287) . In his response to Worcester's objection, James A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMOTION 10 (1894) in effect conceded the point. Thereby, however, James accepted that at least in the typical case, emotions are caused by cognitive processes, specifically by appraisals of objects as relevant for one's well-being (Arnold, 1960 ; see the next section). However, neither James nor Worcester clarified the cognitive processes involved in the generation of different emotions in more detail.
In fact, though, this issue had already been investigated in considerable detail in the cognitive tradition of emotion theorizing dating back to Aristotle (350 b. c.) . In 19 th century introspective psychology, this tradition was represented, among others, by the cognitive emotion theories proposed by Alexius Meinong (1894) and Carl Stumpf (1899) (see Reisenzein, 2006; Reisenzein & Schönpflug, 1992) . Unfortunately, however, these early cognitive emotion theories 1 became buried under the "behaviorist avalanche" (Leahey, 2003) .
It was only during the cognitive revolution of the early 1960ies that the cognitive tradition of emotion theorizing was rediscovered (and partly reinvented) in psychology. The two theorists most responsible for this development were Magda B. Arnold (1960) and Richard S. Lazarus (1966) , the pioneers of cognitive emotion theory in post-behaviorist psychology.
The Arnold-Lazarus Theory
Whereas James regarded the phenomenal character of emotions-the fact that it feels a particular way to have emotions-as their most salient feature and that most in need of explanation, Arnold (1960) focused on another property of emotions that had already been 1 In contemporary psychology, the term "cognitive emotion theory" is typically used to denote any emotion theory which assumes that cognitions-paradigmatically beliefs, in particular evaluative beliefs-are necessary conditions for emotions, even if they are only regarded as causally rather than constitutionally necessary for emotions. In contrast, in contemporary philosophy, the term "cognitive emotion theory" is typically used in a narrower sense to denote emotion theories which claim that emotions are cognitions (of a certain kind; typically evaluative beliefs) or contain such cognitions as components; implying not only that emotions are intentional (object-directed, or representational) mental states, but more specifically, that they are cognitive (information-providing) mental states (see Reisenzein & Döring, 2009) .
the influence of emotion-dampening drugs etc.), the described cognitions are also sufficient for joy and sorrow to occur.
Although Arnold (1960) is not fully explicit on this point, it appears that she thought that the evaluation of an event as positive or negative is the outcome of a comparison of the event with one's goals or desires: Events are positive if they are goal-congruent (fulfill a desire) and negative if they are goal-incongruent (frustrate a desire). This view of the appraisal process can be found in explicit form in Lazarus (1966) and has been adopted by most subsequent appraisal theorists (Reisenzein, 2006 Lazarus, 1966) . These experimental studies did much to make appraisal theory scientifically respectable in psychology. 4 Note that "appraisal" is here used in a broad sense that includes all emotion-relevant factual
More Recent Appraisal Theories
Since the 1960ies, the appraisal theory of emotion has become the dominant approach to the explanation of emotion generation in psychology. Over the years, however, the original version of the theory proposed by Arnold and Lazarus has been found wanting in various respects, and accordingly, improved appraisal theories have been proposed (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2001; Smith & Lazarus, 1990 ; for an overview, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003 ; and for a recent discussion, Moors, Ellsworth, Frijda, 2013) . These newer appraisal theories share with the Arnold-Lazarus theory the basic assumption that emotions are products of factual and evaluative cognitions.
However, unlike Arnold and Lazarus, they typically distinguish between different kinds of evaluations of the eliciting events (e.g., personally desirable/undesirable versus morally good/bad) and postulate additional, as well as partly different, factual appraisals (e.g., probability of the event, unexpectedness of the event, and responsibility for the event).
Perhaps the most elaborated, as well as the most systematic of the newer appraisal theories was proposed by Ortony et al. (1988) . Ortony et al. specify the cognitions underlying 11 positive and 11 emotions and argue with some plausibility that other emotions are subspecies of these 22 emotions. The OCC model, as it is often referred to, has become the most widely used psychological template for computational models of emotion generation. Other more recent appraisal theories, such as those proposed by Smith and Lazarus (1990) , and Scherer (2001), also seek to describe the computational processes of emotion generation in greater detail than Arnold and Lazarus did. A common assumption of these "process models" of appraisal is that appraisal processes can occur in several different modes, in particular as nonautomatic and as automatic processes. Whereas nonautomatic appraisal processes are akin to conscious inference strategies, automatic appraisals are assumed to be unconscious and evaluative cognitions. In a narrow meaning, "appraisal" refers to evaluations only.
and to be triggered fairly directly by the perception of eliciting events. Like other cognitive processes, initially nonautomatic, conscious appraisals can become automatized as a result of their repeated execution (e.g., Reisenzein, 2001) . Automatic appraisals can explain why emotions frequently follow eliciting events rapidly.
Like the foundational appraisal theory of Lazarus (1966) , the more recent appraisal theories have generated a sizable body of empirical research (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) . Most of this research has been aimed at providing support for the assumption that 
The motivational function of emotions
The motivational function of emotions consists of their adaptive effects on action goals. It has been argued that emotions serve both to re-prioritize existing goals or intentions, and generate to new ones (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987 There can be little doubt that emotions influence motivation partly through the hedonistic route (see e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007) . However, several emotion and motivation theorists have argued that this not the only path from emotion to motivation. Rather, according to these theorists, at least some emotions evoke adaptive goals or action tendencies (e.g., fear causes the desire to flee, anger to aggress, pity to help) directly, that is, without the mediation of hedonistic desires (e.g., McDougall, 1908 McDougall, /1960 Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1995 ; for a discussion see Reisenzein, 1996) . Conceivably, this nonhedonistic effect of emotions on motivation is based on their attention-directing and informational functions. The nonhedonistic theory of the emotion-action link may be better able than the hedonistic theory to explain the motivational effects of some emotions, such as the effect of pity on helping and of anger on aggression (Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004).
The three described functions of emotions-the attention-directing, informational, and motivational function-can be seen as contributing, in different ways, to a single overarching function of emotions: to improve the generation of adaptive intentional actions (at least in the evolutionary environment). To achieve this effect, emotions need to influence the motivational machinery that proximately controls actions. According to the standard view of action generation in psychology and other disciplines, actions are proximately caused by a mechanism whose inputs are the person's desires (goals) and her means-ends beliefs, and whose basic decision principle is that agents attempt to do what they believe will lead to what particularly convincing version of this objection-because it was supported by systematic experimental data-was published by Walter B. Cannon (1927) . As a result, for many years, James's theory of emotion was widely regarded as having been refuted by Cannon.
However, in the wake of the renaissance of emotion research after the cognitive revolution of the 1960ies, a number of emotion researchers argued that Cannon's criticisms were overdone and that a revised version of James's theory of the nature of emotion might, after all, be tenable. Accordingly, several more or less strongly modified Neo-Jamesian theories were proposed (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Laird, 1974; Schachter, 1964) . In support of their views, the Neo-Jamesians refer to a variety of more recent empirical findings. The relatively most convincing of these are studies which suggest that experimentally induced physiological and expressive changes can, under certain circumstances, intensify emotional experiences (see Laird, 2007 , for a summary). To illustrate, Strack, Martin and Stepper (1988) found that when participants held a pen between their front teeth in a way that resulted in an expression resembling a smile, they judged cartoons to be funnier than in a no-smile control condition, suggesting that they felt more strongly amused. However, interesting as these findings are, they do not show that emotions are nothing but sensations of bodily (including facial) changes; nor even, that bodily perceptions are necessary for emotions. In fact, other evidence suggests that this is not the case. In particular, studies of the emotional experiences of spinal-cord-injured people, who have much reduced bodily feedback, suggest that their emotional life is largely intact (e.g., Cobos, Sánchez, Garcia, Vera, & Vila, 2002;
see Reisenzein & Stephan, in press) . Similarly, studies on the effects of beta-adrenergic blocking agents (which specifically inhibit the reactivity of the cardiovascular system) on emotions typically failed to find reduced emotions in healthy subjects (e.g., Erdmann & van Lindern, 1980) . Likewise, the experimental or natural reduction of facial feedback typically does not diminish emotional experience (see Reisenzein & Stephan, in press).
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Mental Feeling Theory
Although the available evidence suggests that emotional experiences are not (at very least not only) bodily sensations, James's more basic intuition, that the phenomenal quality of emotions is best explained by assuming that they are sensation-like mental states, remains forceful (Reisenzein, 2012) . This intuition can be saved if one assumes that although emotions are indeed sensation-like feelings (or at least, contain such feelings as components;
see the next section), the emotional feelings are not created in the body but in the brain (e.g., Buck, 1985; Cannon, 1927; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Wundt, 1896) . The oldest and most prominent of these "mental" (as opposed to James's "bodily") feeling theories of emotion holds that emotions are feelings of pleasure and displeasure (e.g., Bentham, 1789 Bentham, /1970 . Pleasure-displeasure theory was in fact the standard view of the phenomenal quality of emotional feelings in 19 th century psychology (e.g., Meinong, 1894; Wundt, 1896).
Notwithstanding James's protest that this "hackneyed psychological doctrine....
[is] one of the most artificial and scholastic of the untruths that disfigure our science" (James, 1894, p. 525), pleasure-displeasure theory is in fact much better established empirically than James's own theory of emotional experience (see e.g., Mellers, 2000; Russell, 2003) and is today held, in some form, by many emotion researchers (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1998; Mellers, 2000; Reisenzein, 2009b) .
However, one must concede to James (1894) that, taken by itself, pleasure-displeasure theory cannot account for the qualitative distinctions among emotional experiences beyond positive-negative. As one attempt to overcome this problem of the theory, several theorists have postulated other mental feelings in addition to (or in place of; see Footnote 6) pleasure and displeasure. For example, Wundt (1896) proposed that (a) the centrally generated emotional feelings comprise not just pleasure-displeasure, but two more pairs of opposed (mutually exclusive) feeling qualities, excitement-quiescence and tension-relaxation; and that (b) emotions are different mixtures of these six "basic feelings" (e.g., anger is an unpleasant feeling also characterized, at least typically, by excitement and tension). In broad agreement with Wundt, contemporary "dimensional" theories of emotional experience (e.g., Russell, 2003; see also Reisenzein, 1994) assume that the feeling core of emotions consists of mixtures of pleasure or displeasure and (cortically produced) activation or deactivation (which corresponds approximately to Wundt's dimension of excitement-quiescence).
Supportive evidence for this theory is summarized in Russell (2003).
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Cognition-Feeling Theory
Although mental feeling theory is able to solve some problems of bodily feeling theory, it does not solve all. Two remaining problems are: (1) even if one assumes the existence of several different mental feeling qualities, this still does not allow to explain the fine-grained distinctions among emotions; and (2) like the bodily feeling theory, the mental feeling theory has difficulties accounting for the object-directedness of emotions. To solve these problems, several feeling theorists have proposed to bring in other mental elements into the emotion in addition to feelings. The most frequently proposed additional emotion components have been the cognitions (appraisals) by which the emotional feelings are caused (e.g., Schachter, 1964; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) . According to the resulting "hybrid" cognition-feeling theory, emotional experiences are complex mental states that consist of feelings plus the appraisals that caused them. Because appraisals are undoubtedly finely differentiated, cognition-feeling theory is able to solve the problem of 6 Another version of mental feeling theory postulates several distinct, unanalyzable mental feelings corresponding to presumed biologically basic emotions, such as joy, sadness, fear, anger, and disgust (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1987; see also Buck, 1985) . On a broad understanding of "mental feelings", one can also subsume in the category of mental feeling theories the proposal that emotions are felt action tendencies (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986) . However, both of these versions of mental feeling theory have to cope with a number of problems (Reisenzein, 1995; 1996) . emotion differentiation. It also seems to be able solve, at first sight at least, the problem of accounting for the object-directedness of emotions: According to cognition-feeling theory, emotions have objects because they contain object-directed cognitions as components and their objects are just the objects of these cognitions (but see Reisenzein, 2012, for objections to this idea).
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However, the "hybrid" cognition-feeling theory is not the only option available to the feeling theorists. To solve the emotion differentiation problem, feeling theorists need not assume that cognitions are components of emotion; they can continue to regard them as the causes of emotions construed as sensation-like feelings, but assume that emotions are partly distinguished by their causes (Reisenzein, 1994; 2012) . For example, joy can be analyzed as a feeling of pleasure caused by the belief that a desire has been fulfilled, whereas pride can be analyzed as a feeling of pleasure caused by the belief that one has made an extraordinary achievement. With respect to the problem of accounting for the object-directedness of emotions, feeling theorists can argue that subjective impressions are misleading and that emotions do not really represent the objects at which they seem to be focused (e.g., Reisenzein, 2009a) . For a discussion of these options, see Reisenzein (2012) .
The Evolutionary Core of the Emotion System
In my discussion of the effects of emotion, I already referred to their adaptive effects, or biological functions. The assumption that such functions exist implies that at least the core of the emotion system has been created by evolutionary processes, specifically through natural selection. This hypothesis is per se not very controversial among today's emotion psychologists; after all, presumably the cores of all mental subsystems (perception, cognition, 7 Impressed by the apparent ability of cognitions (appraisals) to explain the differentiation and object-directedness of emotions, several emotion theorists-mostly in philosophy-have proposed that emotional experiences are just conscious evaluations (e.g., Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 1976) . However, this "radically cognitive" theory of the nature of emotions has its
